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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in every jurisdiction seek judicial efficiency and econ-
omy.' Many courts attempt to achieve this goal by limiting the
t J.D. Candidate 2002, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. University of
St. Thomas, 1999.
1. Jonathan R. Macey, The Pervasive Influence of Economic Analysis on Legal De-
cision Making, 17 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 116 (1993) (discussing the judici-
ary's goal to achieve economic efficiency); Jeffrey Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects
ofJudicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1447, 1478 (1991) (statingjudges often seek effi-
ciency when rendering decisions); Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, reprinted in 1 LAW AND ECONOMICS 122, 145
(Richard.A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997) (stating the desire to minimize
costs dominates much of legal rulemaking); see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1998) (arguing that the common law can be best under-
stood as an attempt to achieve economic efficiency); George L. Priest, The Common
Law Process and The Selection of Efficient Rules, reprinted in 1 LAW AND ECONOMICS 165
(Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997) (examining the tendency to
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number of interlocutory appeals2 parties may make. Recently, the
Minnesota Supreme Court had a chance to expand the number of
interlocutory appeals it allows.4 In Engvall v. Soo Line Railroad Co.,'
the court considered two issues: first, whether a party could appeal
the dismissal of another party before final judgment has been en-
tered in a multi-party suit;' and second, whether such interlocutory
appeals are permissive' or mandatory.9
The court ruled an interlocutory order dismissing one party
from a multi-party suit could not be appealed before final judg-
ment, absent an express determination by the trial judge that there
is no just reason to delay the appeal. 0 The court also ruled that in-
terlocutory appeals are permissive rather than mandatory"-thereby
clarifying Minnesota's rules regarding interlocutory appeals.
This note examines the history of interlocutory appeals in the
create legal rules that achieve efficiency and concluding the desire for economi-
cally sound legal rules plays a larger role in the legal system than one might ex-
pect).
2. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990) (defining interlocutory ap-
peal as an appeal made between the commencement and the end of a suit).
3. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1978) (refusing to
allow interlocutory appeal as of right so as to ensure efficiency in the appellate
court system); see also Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc., 418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 1988)
(stating the prevention of piecemeal litigation preserves judicial efficiency). Few
courts have precisely defined piecemeal litigation. Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch
Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99, 134 (1986). It is often de-
fined as "duplicative, wasteful litigation." Id. (quoting United States v. Adair, 723
F.2d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1983) and Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 966-67 (2d Cir.
1980)). However, the literal definition of piecemeal is to accomplish something in
a fragmented manner. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 880 (10th ed.
1993). Therefore, it can be inferred that piecemeal litigation means to allow a
case to be appealed in a fragmented manner, one ruling at a time. See generally
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.1 (3d ed. 1999) (referring to
piecemeal litigation as reviewing a case before final judgment has been rendered).
4. Engvall v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 605 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn. 2000).
5. 605 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. 2000).
6. Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining final judgment as the
end of litigation on the merits, leaving nothing left for the court to do but enter
judgment); see also 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3909 (1992) (discussing the leading
decisions in an attempt to determine what constitutes a final judgment).
7. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 741.
8. Id. The court defines permissive to mean a party has the option to appeal
the ruling immediately or wait to appeal from the finaljudgment. Id.
9. Id. The court defines mandatory to mean the right to appeal the ruling is
lost if it is not taken from an interlocutory ruling. Id.
10. Id. at 744.
11. Id. at 745.
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United States - focusing primarily on multi-party litigation. 1" The
note also explores the types of interlocutory appeals recognized in
Minnesota. 3 Part III details the facts and the supreme court's hold-
ing in Engvall,14 while Part IV analyzes the ramifications and signifi-
cance of the ruling. 5 The note concludes that the court has articu-
lated a clear rule that advances judicial efficiency and economy.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Interlocutory Appeals At Common Law
At common law, an appeal could only be taken after all issues
and claims had been decided and the court had entered final
judgment." The majority of American courts followed the com-
mon law and allowed an appeal to be taken only from a final judg-
ment.'s This meant that in cases involving multiple parties, an ap-
12. Infra Part II.A.
13. Infra Part ll.B.
14. Infra Part III.A-B.
15. Infra Part IV.A-B.
16. Infra Part V.
17. Metcalfe's case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1193 (K.B. 1760). The finaljudgment
rule arose in England because the King's Bench used a writ of error to correct the
errors of the common law courts. Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis
For Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 543 (1932). The writ was regarded as a new action and
not merely a continuation of the suit in the lower court. Id. Thus, suing out a writ
of error before final judgment would result in two actions in different courts -
each of which the formal record was essential. Id.
18. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 668 (1891) (allowing appeal only after final
judgment). In addition to the federal system, 49jurisdictions follow the common
law while only 2jurisdictions do not. Montgomery Traction Co. v. Harmon, 37 So.
371, 376 (Ala. 1904) (holding appeal from interlocutory decree only allowable by
statute); City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 352 P.2d 129, 131 (Alaska 1960) (refusing to
review appeal before final judgment); Douglas Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co. v.
Lamb, 25 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Ariz. 1933) (stating no appeal lies from interlocutory
order); Miller v. O'Bryan, 36 Ark. 200 (Ark. 1880) (dismissing interlocutory appeal
before final judgment); More v. Miller, 54 P. 263, 264 (Cal. 1898) (ruling an ap-
peal cannot be taken before finaljudgment); Townsend v. Petersen, 21 P. 619, 620
(Colo. 1889) (allowing an appeal only after final judgment); Mechanics' Bank v.
Woodward, 51 A. 1084, 1085 (Conn. 1902) (stating no appeal lies until after final
judgment); Ridings v. McMenamin, 39 A. 463, 464 (Del. 1897) (stating court may
not review appeal until final judgment); AL. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goldberg, 39
A.2d 563, 564 (D.C. 1944) (holding interlocutory appeal not reviewable); Huie v.
State, 92 So. 2d 264, 268 (Fla. 1957) (stating interlocutory orders are not appeal-
able in the absence ofjudgment); Durrence v. Water, 79 S.E. 841, 841 (Ga. 1913)
(declining to review writ of error until after final judgment); Iwai v. City and
County of Honolulu, 459 P.2d 195, 195 (Haw. 1969) (declaring interlocutory ap-
peals not reviewable until final judgment); Connell v. Warren, 27 P. 730, 730
20001 1235
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(Idaho 1891) (stating an order issued before final judgment is not reviewable);
City of Park Ridge v. Murphy, 101 N.E. 524, 525 (Ill. 1913) (refusing to review an
interlocutory appeal); Foster v. Lindley, 50 N.E. 367, 368 (Ind. App. 1898) (dis-
missing interlocutory appeal before final judgment); In re Receivership of Bank of
Hamburg, 214 N.W. 561, 561 (Iowa 1927) (holding right to appeal interlocutory
order only arises after final judgment); Douglas v. Byers, 76 P. 1129, 1129 (Kan.
1904) (classifying interlocutory appeals as not reviewable); Steinke v. N. Vernon
Lumber Co., 227 S.W. 274, 278 (Ky. 1921) (allowing review of interlocutory appeal
only after final judgment); Schwing v. Dunlap, 51 So. 684, 685 (La. 1910) (dismiss-
ing appeal before final judgment as premature); Cameron v. Tyler, 71 Me. 27, 27
(Me. 1880) (holding interlocutory orders must not be reviewed until final judg-
ment); H.M. Rowe Co. v. Rowe, 141 A. 334, 337 (Md. 1928) (dismissing interlocu-
tory appeal); Shawmut Commercial Paper Co. v. Cram, 98 N.E. 696, 696 (Mass.
1912) (denying an appeal before finaljudgment); Fitzsimmons v. Milwaukee, L.S.
& W. Ry. Co., 57 N.W. 127, 128 (Mich. 1893) (refusing to review interlocutory ap-
peal); Phila. Storage Battery Co. v. Hawley, 154 Minn. 538, 538, 191 N.W. 815, 816
(1923) (holding orders made before judgment are not appealable until after final
judgment); Fed. Land Bank v. Kimbriel, 163 So. 501, 502 (Miss. 1935) (holding
plaintiff not entitled to appeal from interlocutory decree); Magee v. Mercantile-
Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 98 S.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Mo. 1936) (stating inter-
locutory orders not appealable); In reTuohy's Estate, 58 P. 722, 723 (Mont. 1899)
(holding appeal will not lie until after final judgment); Sewall v. Whiton, 123 N.W.
1042, 1043 (Neb. 1909) (holding interlocutory decree not appealable); Rhodes v.
Williams, 12 Nev. 20, 22 (Nev. 1877) (classifying and dismissing interlocutory ap-
peal as "premature"); MacMullen v. Kingsley, 82 A. 46, 46-47 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1912)
(stating an appeal cannot be taken before final judgment); Schofield v. Am. Value
Co., 54 P. 753, 756 (N.M. 1898) (prohibiting interlocutory appeals); Cape Fear &
Yadkin Valley R.R. Co. v. King, 34 S.E. 541, 542 (N.C. 1899) (holding interlocutory
appeal not reviewable); Harris Mfg. Co. v. Walsh, 3 N.W. 307, 308-09 (Dakota
1879) (allowing appeals only from final judgment); Ebersole v. Schiller, 35 N.E.
793, 793 (Ohio 1893) (holding an appeal does not lie until after final judgment);
Hardesty v. Naharkey, 213 P. 89, 92 (Okla. 1923) (holding interlocutory appeal
not reviewable);Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 213 P. 415, 416 (Or. 1923) (declining to review
interlocutory appeal); Stadler v. Borough of Mt. Oliver, 95 A.2d 776, 776 (Pa.
1953) (stating appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal);
Andrade v. Nunes, 139 A. 427, 427 (R.I. 1928) (dismissing interlocutory appeal);
Brown v. Pechman 33 S.E. 732, 734 (S.C. 1899) (stating interlocutory appeal can
only be reviewed after final judgment has been entered); Warwick v. Bliss, 216
N.W. 865, 866 (S.D. 1927) (dismissing interlocutory appeal); Employers' Reins.
Corp. v. Going, 26 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tenn. 1930) (holding interlocutory appeal
not reviewable until final judgment); Tex. Co. v. Honaker, 282 S.W. 879, 882 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926) (refusing to review writ of error before final judgment); Lukich v.
Utah Const. Co., 160 P. 270, 271 (Utah 1916) (holding appeal may not be taken
until final judgment); Taft v. Mossey, 59 A. 166, 166 (Vt. 1904) (dismissing inter-
locutory appeal); Baber v. Page, 120 S.E. 137, 137 (Va. 1923) (stating final judg-
ment must be entered before appeal can be taken); State Bank of Goldendale v.
Beeks, 204 P. 771, 772 (Wash. 1922) (stating interlocutory appeals are not review-
able until final judgment); Kerfoot v. Dandridge, 71 S.E. 396, 397 (W. Va. 1911)
(holding interlocutory order not appealable until final judgment); Willing v. Por-
ter, 63 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Wis. 1954) (stating appeal before final judgment must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction); Hahn v. Citizens' State Bank, 171 P. 889, 890-
91 (Wyo. 1918) (stating final judgment must be entered before appeal can be
taken). But see Glover v. Baker, 81 A. 1081, 1082 (N.H. 1911) (allowing review of
1236 [Vol. 27:2
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peal could not be taken until all of the claims had been finally de-
termined as to all of the defendants. 9
The policy behind the final judgment rule was to promote ju-
dicial efficiency and economy by preventing appellate review be-
fore final judgment had been rendered in a case. Ideally, the rule
lightened the appellate courts' dockets because all of a party's ob-
jections would be consolidated into one appeal, and final disposi-
tion in the trial court through settlement or favorable judgment of-
ten precluded appeal."
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, the nature of civil actions grew more complex because the
Rules permitted liberal joinder of parties and claims in a single ac-
tion.12 Drafters of the Rules recognized that postponing an appeal
until after a final judgment could result in undue hardship to cer-
tain parties. At the same time, the drafters did not want to en-.. . 24 ... 25
courage piecemeal litigation and sacrifice judicial efficiency.
26
As a result, Rule 54(b) was included in the federal rules. The
order before final judgment); Waldo v. Schmidt, 93 N.E. 477, 479-80 (N.Y. 1910)
(permitting parties to freely appeal interlocutory orders).
19. Hohorst v. Hamburg-Am. Packet Co., 148 U.S. 262, 266 (1893). This rule
caused little difficulty because litigation largely consisted of single party and single
claim disputes. 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2653 (3d ed. 1998).
20. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (stating "the
final judgment rule promotes efficient judicial administration").
21. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, § 13.1, at 584.
22. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 2653. Many of the rules encourage joinder of
parties and claims. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (stating a party may join as many
claims as a party has against an opposing party); FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (stating addi-
tional parties must be included in the action if feasible).
23. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432-36 (1956). Hardship
most often occurs when ajudge issues an order or judgment at the early stages of
litigation and several years pass before the entire lawsuit is completed. WRIGHT,
supra note 19, § 2654. Postponing an appeal under these circumstances may result
in unnecessary delay for those parties who have received a final judgment on their
claim. Id.
24. Supra note 3.
25. Sears, 351 U.S. at 432.
26. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 2654. Originally, the rule only attempted to de-
fine what would constitute a final judgment when an action involved multiple
claims. 6JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.01 [1], at 54-9 (2d ed.
1996). It failed to alleviate the problems associated with complex litigation be-
cause many judges interpreted the language to simply restate the final judgment
rule. Id. The rule was then amended in 1946 to allow ajudge to certify an appeal
after entering judgment on a particular claim in a multiclaim action. Id. at 54-10
to 54-11. In 1961, the rule was amended again to include actions involving multi-
ple parties and remains unchanged. Id. at 54-11 to 54-12.
20001 1237
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rule permits a trial judge to enter judgment on one or more, but
less than all, of the claims or parties involved in an action." Once
judgment has been entered upon a particular claim, the trial judge
may certify the order as immediately appealable by making an ex-• 28
press determination that there is no just reason to delay. Rule
54(b) drafters intended to prevent piecemeal litigation while pro-
tecting parties from hardship that may result from adjudication of
less than all of the claims or parties.29
B. Interlocutory Appeals Recognized In Minnesota
Faced with the same increase in complex civil litigation at the
state level, Minnesota adopted Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
54.02 in 1951.' o Similar to Federal Rule 54(b), the rule gives trial
court judges discretion to identify certain interlocutory orders in
multi-party suits as immediately appealable by making an express
determination that there is no just reason to delay.
3 1
While Rule 54.02 provides one basis for appellate jurisdiction,
Minnesota case law has recognized additional instances in which an
27. Sears, 351 U.S. at 432.
28. Id. at 435.
29. Id. at 434. In addition to Rule 54(b), the federal system developed other
exceptions to the final judgment rule. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 2658. Interlocu-
tory appeals may be taken from orders involving injunctions, receiverships, admi-
ralty cases, and patent infringement cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1997). Interlocu-
tory appeals are also allowed when a trial judge certifies that the order should be
appealed because it involves a controlling question of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1997). The judicially-created collateral order doctrine allows interlocutory ap-
peals to be taken if the trial court's decision determines a matter unrelated to the
merits of the action but is too important to be denied review. Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
30. MINN. R. Civ. P. 54.02; 2 DAVID F. HERR & ROGERS. HAYDOCK, CIVIL RULES
ANNOTATED § 54.9 (3d ed. 1998). Around the same time period, the majority of
other jurisdictions adopted rules governing suits involving the adjudication of less
than all of the parties or claims involved. ALA. R. Crv. P. 54(b); ALASKA R. Crv. P.
54(b); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 54(b); ARK. R. Civ. P. 54(b); COLO. R. Civ. P. 54(b); DEL. R.
CH. CT. 54(b); D.C. R. Crv. P. 54(b); GA. R. Civ. PR~c. CODE §9-11-54(b); HAw. R.
Crv. P. 54(b); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 54(b); ILL. S. CT. R. 304(a); IND. R. Civ. P. 54(b);
KAN. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-254(b) (West 1999); Ky. R. Civ. P. 54.02; ME. R.
Civ. P. 54(b); MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(b); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.604; Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(b);
Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.01; MONT. R. Crv. P. 54(b); NEv. R. Civ. P. 54(b); N.M. R. Civ. P.
1-054; N.C. R. Crv. P. 54(b); N.D. R. Crv. P. 54(b); OHio R. CiV. P. 54(b); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 994 (2000); OR. R. Civ. P. 67(b); PA. R. APP. P. 341 (c); R.I. R. CIV. P.
54(b); S.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 15-6-54(b) (Michie 1999); TENN.
R. Civ. P. 62.09; TEx. R. Civ. P. 301; UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(b); VT. R. CIv. P. 54(b);
WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 54(b); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Wyo. R. Crv. P. 54(b).
31. HERR& HAYDOCK, supra note 30, § 54.9.
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appeal may be allowed, absent certification by the trial judge.32 For
instance, in Anderson v. City of Hopkins, the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized the federal system's collateral order doctrine
34
and allowed an immediate appeal from an order denying a motion
for summary judgment based on a claim of government immunity,
without an express determination by the trial court.
32. Id. at § 54.10. In addition to case law, statutory provisions allow interlocu-
tory appeals from orders involving an injunction, vacating or sustaining an at-
tachment, and denying a new trial. MINN. R. App. P. 103.03. Interlocutory appeals
are also allowed if the judge certifies that the question is important and doubtful.
Id.
33. 393 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1986).
34. Supra note 29.
35. Anderson, 393 N.W.2d at 363. The majority of jurisdictions follow this
rule. E.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (allowing an immediate
appeal of lower court's denial of summary judgment based on government immu-
nity); City of Phoenix v. Yarnell, 909 P.2d 377, 382 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that ap-
pellate court may review trial court's adverse ruling on the issue of immunity be-
fore final judgment); Robinson v. Langdon, 970 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Ark. 1998)
(allowing appeal before final judgment to decide the issue of immunity); Walton v.
State, 968 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Colo. 1998) (authorizing interlocutory appeal for de-
termination of government immunity); Shay v. Rossi, 749 A.2d 1147, 1164 (Conn.
2000) (stating interlocutory appeal may be taken for order denying a motion to
dismiss based on immunity); Blum v. Kauffman, 286 A.2d 757, 759 (Del. 1972)
(stating the denial of summary judgment based on government immunity is im-
mediately appealable); Durso v. Taylor, 624 A.2d 449, 458 (D.C. 1993) (reviewing
an interlocutory appeal from an order denying summary judgment based on im-
munity); Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 1994) (holding that order
denying summary judgment based on government immunity is subject to inter-
locutory review); State v. Livengood, 688 N.E.2d 189, 191-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)
(granting petition for interlocutory appeal to review issue of government immu-
nity); Keystone Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa
1998) (granting an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of summary
judgment based on government immunity); J.R.M. v. City of Portland, 669 A.2d
159, 160 (Me. 1995) (noting that appeal of denial of summaryjudgment on issue
of sovereign immunity falls within exception to final judgment rule); Bradley v.
Fisher, 688 A.2d 527, 605 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (stating order denying mo-
tion for summaryjudgment on immunity grounds is immediately appealable); Wil-
liams v. Hartman, 597 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 n.3 (Mass. 1992) (noting that the appeals
court correctly decided to grant an interlocutory appeal to determine immunity);
Leflore County v. Givens, 754 So. 2d 1223, 1224-25 (Miss. 2000) (granting petition
for interlocutory appeal to review denial of summary judgment based on govern-
ment immunity); State of Mo. Highway and Transp. Comm'n v. Dierker, 961
S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo. 1988) (allowing immediate appeal of order denying summary
judgment based on sovereign immunity); Richardson v. Chevrefils, 552 A.2d 89, 92
(N.H. 1988) (allowing an immediate appeal of the denial of summary judgment
based on immunity); D'Annunzio v. Borough of Wildwood Crest, 410 A.2d 1180,
1181 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (allowing interlocutory appeal from order
denying summary judgment based on immunity); Carrillo v. Rostro, 845 P.2d 130,
132-33 (N.M. 1992) (stating issue of immunity is subject to appellate review before
final judgment); Kaczmarek v. Conroy, 635 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311 (N.Y. App. Div.
12392000]
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In Hunt v. Nevada State Bank,16 the court held that dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction is immediately appealable without cer-
tification by the trial court.3 7 The court added another exception
1995) (allowing immediate appeal of order denying motion for summary judg-
ment based on immunity); Reid v. Town of Madison, 527 S.E.2d 87, 89 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (stating the denial of a motion for summary judgment on basis of im-
munity warrants immediate appeal); Kagy v. Toledo-Lucas County Port Auth., 699
N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that denial of summary judgment
based on immunity is an appealable order); Fann v. Brailey, 841 S.W.2d 833, 835
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing immediate appeal of denial of summary judg-
ment based on immunity); City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.
1993) (stating that party may immediately appeal denial of summary judgment
based on immunity); Murray v. White, 587 A.2d 975, 978-79 (Vt. 1991) (holding
that defendant is entitled to appeal denial of summary judgment based on immu-
nity); Lawson v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1996) (stating denial of sum-
mary judgment on basis of immunity is appealable). But see Ex Pante Franklin
County Dept. of Human Res., 674 So. 2d 1277, 1280 (Ala. 1996) (refusing to re-
view lower court's denial of summary judgment based on sovereign immunity);
Samuel v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr.2d 420, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(declining to take interlocutory appeal of trial judge's denial of summary judg-
ment based on immunity); State v. Gober, 494 S.E.2d 724, 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding court order denying state's motion for summary judgment based on im-
munity was not subject to direct appeal); Brown v. Wong, 795 P.2d 283, 284 (Haw.
1990) (stating an order denying summary judgment based on government immu-
nity is not immediately appealable); Pizzato's Inc. v. City of Berwyn, 523 N.E.2d 51,
52-53 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (ruling that appellate court could not review interlocu-
tory appeal of order denying a motion to dismiss claim based on immunity);
Griggs v. City of Goddard, 666 P.2d 695, 696 (Kan. 1983) (refusing to review de-
nial of summary judgment based on government immunity without certification
from trial judge); Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. 1981) (stating there
is no right to appeal from a denial of summaryjudgment); Eichhorn v. Lamphere
Sch. Dist., 421 N.W.2d 230, 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (stating denial of motion
for summary judgment based on immunity is not an appealable order); In re Litig.
Relating to the Riot of Sept. 22, 1991, At the Maximum Sec. Unit of the Mont.
State Prison, 939 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Mont. 1997) (holding order denying motion
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not appealable before final
judgment); Shearer v. Leuenberger, 591 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Neb. 1999) (stating
generally that the denial of summaryjudgment is not appealable unless both par-
ties have moved for summary judgment and the trial court has sustained one of
the motions); Klindtworth v. Burkett, 477 N.W.2d 176, 183 (N.D. 1991) (holding
that denial of summary judgment based on immunity was not appealable); Lam-
bert v. Town of Stringtown, 834 P.2d 955, 956 (Okla. 1992) (holding appellate
court lacks jurisdiction over appeal from denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity); Urbano v. Meneses, 431 A.2d 308, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(stating order denying township's immunity-based objections was not immediately
appealable); Halloran v. State Dep't of Children, Youth, and Families, 729 A.2d
709, 711 (R.I. 1999) (holding order denying motion to dismiss based on qualified
immunity was not immediately appealable); Walden v. City of Seattle, 892 P.2d
745, 748 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding city had no right to immediately appeal
denial of summary judgment based on immunity).
36. 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969).
37. Id. at 88-89, 172 N.W.2d at 300. Only nine jurisdictions follow this rule.
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Ex pane Paul Maclean Land Serv., Inc., 613 So. 2d 1284, 1286 (Ala. 1993) (allowing
an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal juris-
diction); Longo v. Longo, 515 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over person is ap-
pealable); Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1246 (Il1. 1990) (stating party may
seek appellate review of court order denying motion to dismiss based on personal
jurisdiction); Lee v. Goshen Rubber Co., 635 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(reviewing an interlocutory appeal from the denial of defendant's motion to dis-
miss based on lack of personal jurisdiction); Bankers Trust Co. v. Fidata Trust Co.
N.Y., 452 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Iowa 1990) (reviewing appeal from order denying mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction before final judgment); Mosier v.
Kinley, 702 A.2d 803, 809 (N.H. 1997) (holding defendant must immediately ap-
peal an order denying a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction);
State ex rel. Anaya v. Columbia Research Corp., 583 P.2d 468, 468 (N.M. 1978) (al-
lowing an appeal from order denying motion to dismiss based on lack of personal
jurisdiction); Howard v. Spitalnik, 414 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (review-
ing lower court's denial of motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter juris-
diction before final judgment); Love v. Moore, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (N.C. 1982)
(stating party may appeal an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person).
The majority of jurisdictions ruling on this issue oppose Minnesota and hold that
an order denying a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction is not
immediately appealable. Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 185 F.2d 800, 803
(8th Cir. 1950) (holding order denying motion to quash service of process is not
immediately appealable); Jacobson v. N. Trust Co., 234 P. 563, 563 (Ariz. 1925)
(refusing to review appeal from order denying summary judgment based on per-
sonal jurisdiction); Hogue v. Hogue, 208 S.W. 579, 581 (Ark. 1919) (stating there
is no appeal from refusal to quash a summons); Bing v. Chan Lai Yung Gee, 202
P.2d 360, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (stating the denial of motion contesting juris-
diction is not appealable); Smardo v. Huisenga, 412 P.2d 431, 432 (Colo. 1966)
(holding that denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is not
immediately appealable); Crown Oil and Wax Co. of Del. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.,
429 A.2d 1376, 1379 (D.C. 1981) (refusing to entertain appeal from denial of mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); Venus Foods v. Dist. Court of
Eleventh Judicial Dist., 181 P.2d 775, 776 (Idaho 1947) (holding that order deny-
ing motion to quash summons was not appealable); Runnels v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 195 P.2d 571, 571-73 (Kan. 1948) (holding that an order overruling a mo-
tion to dismiss an action is not appealable); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 197 S.W.2d 923,
924 (Ky. 1946) (holding party may not immediately appeal an adverse ruling on
personal jurisdiction); Woodcock v. Crehan, 28 So. 2d 61, 61 (La. Ct. App. 1946)
(stating that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal juris-
diction is not immediately appealable); Breus v. Bezborodko, 704 A.2d 338, 339
(Me. 1997) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion is not immediately appealable); Guerreni v. Sainsbury, 114 A. 874, 876 (Md.
1921) (ruling that no interlocutory appeal can be taken from order overruling a
motion to quash summons based on lack of personal jurisdiction); Holste v. Bur-
lington N. R.R. Co., 592 N.W.2d 894, 904 (Neb. 1999) (holding that an order
overruling a challenge to personal jurisdiction is not appealable); Klepper v.
Klepper, 271 P. 336, 336-37 (Nev. 1928) (stating that no appeal lies from order
denying motion to quash summons and service); Blue Arm v. Volk, 254 N.W.2d
427, 428 (N.D. 1977) (stating that order denying motion for dismissal based on
lack of personal jurisdiction was not appealable); State ex Tel. Bradford v. Trumbull
County Court, 597 N.E.2d 116, 117 (Ohio 1992) (stating that party may not im-
mediately appeal lower court's ruling on jurisdiction until after final judgment);
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in McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church 8 when it allowed an
immediate appeal from an order denying summary judgment
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Shaw v. Davis, 62 P.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Okla. 1936) (holding that court order over-
ruling a motion objecting to jurisdiction is not appealable before final judgment);
Fournier v. Standard Wholesale Co., 279 A.2d 403, 404 (R.I. 1971) (holding that
denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction lacked finality tojustify
appellate review); Mid-State Distrib., Inc., v. Century Imps., Inc., 426 S.E.2d 777,
781 (S.C. 1993) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal ju-
risdiction is interlocutory and not appealable); De Bord v. Brandt, 206 N.W. 925,
925 (S.D. 1926) (refusing to hear appeal from order denying motion to dismiss
based on insufficient service of process); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 597
(Tex. 1996) (allowing immediate review of order denying motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction only upon showing that ordinary appeal would be in-
adequate); State Tax Comm'n v. Larsen, 110 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah 1941) (holding
order objecting to personal jurisdiction not appealable before final judgment);
Barnes v. Thomas, 635 P.2d 135, 136-37 (Wash. 1981) (stating immediate review of
order denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is allowable only
when appeal cannot provide an adequate remedy); Heaton v. Larsen, 294 N.W.2d
15, 24 (Wis. 1980) (holding that order denying motion to dismiss on ground of
lack of personal jurisdiction is not final and therefore not appealable).
38. 527 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1995).
39. Id. at 833. Few jurisdictions have ruled on this issue and only five follow
the McGowan decision. Nishikawa Standard Co. v. Van Phan, 703 N.E.2d 1058,
1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing an interlocutory appeal from lower court's
denial of motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Tillotson v.
Anders, 551 So. 2d 212, 213 (Miss. 1989) (allowing interlocutory appeal to review
objection to subject matterjurisdiction); Gray v. Seidel, 726 A.2d 1283, 1283 (N.H.
1999) (reviewing appeal from order denying motion to dismiss based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); Perri v. Mariarossi, 568 N.Y.S.2d 637, 637-38 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (allowing interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hernandez,
994 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. App. 1999) (ruling interlocutory order denying motion
to dismiss based on subject matter jurisdiction was appealable). The Minnesota
rule is contrary to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S.
229, 236 (1945) (stating the denial of a motion to dismiss, even when based on ju-
risdictional grounds, is not immediately reviewable). Several other jurisdictions
oppose the Minnesota rule. Fiocchi v. Trainello, 566 So. 2d 904, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that denial based on subject matter jurisdiction was not im-
mediately appealable); Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1246 (I11. 1990) (stating
defendants could not immediately appeal an order denying their motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Wall, 693 So.
2d 256, 257 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding judgment denying exception of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction was not immediately appealable);Joyce v. Conary, 317
A.2d 794, 795-96 (Me. 1974) (declaring denial of motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is not reviewable); Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 293 S.E.2d
182, 183-84 (N.C. 1982) (stating the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable); Nordenstrom v. Swedberg,
123 N.W.2d 285, 287 (N.D. 1963) (holding order denying motion to dismiss action
is not immediately appealable); Ratz v. Ratz, 518 A.2d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (stating party challenging decision regarding subject matter jurisdiction
may not immediately appeal); Deskins v. Boltin, 461 S.E.2d 395, 396 (S.C. 1995)
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Recently, the court of appeals in Semiconductor Automation, Inc.
v. Lloyds of London ° went one step further by requiring a plaintiff to
immediately appeal the dismissal for lack of subject matterjurisdic-
tion of one defendant in a multi-party suit absent certification by
41the trial court. With this decision, the court declared that all ap-
peals based on lack of jurisdiction must be immediately appealed
independent of Rule 54.02 42-a holding which has since been over-
ruled by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Engvall v. Soo Line Rail-
road Co."
III. THE ENGVALL DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1996, James Engvall (hereinafter "Engvall") injured his back
during the scope of his employment with Soo Line Railroad Com-
pany (hereinafter "Soo Line").44 He sued Soo Line for his injuries
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (hereinafter "FELA")
and the Locomotive Inspection Act (hereinafter "LIA") .5
In response, Soo Line filed a third-party complaint against
General Motors Corporation (hereinafter "GM"), the locomotive's
(refusing to hear interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to dismiss based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Wells v. Wells, 509 S.E.2d 549, 551-52 (Va. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding denial of motion to dismiss based on subject matter jurisdic-
tion was not immediately appealable); In re Greybull Valley Irrigation Dist., 71 P.2d
801, 802 (Wyo. 1937) (dismissing interlocutory appeal from order overruling ob-
jections to the court's jurisdiction).
40. 543 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), rev. denied (Minn. 1996), overruled
by Engvall v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 605 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. 2000).
41. Semiconductor, 543 N.W.2d at 124. South Carolina is the only other
jurisdiction to adopt a holding identical to Semiconductor. Lebovitz v. Mudd, 347
S.E.2d 94, 96 (S.C. 1986) (stating an order granting a motion to dismiss based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is directly appealable absent certification by the
trial court because it affects a substantial right).
42. Semiconductor, 543 N.W.2d at 123.
43. 605 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. 2000).
44. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 739. The facts are unclear as to whether Engvall
injured his back while tying down a handbrake to a locomotive or using a hand-
wheel to apply a handbrake. Id. However, both the appellant's brief and respon-
dent's brief indicate the injury occurred while Engvall was tying down the hand-
brake. Appellant's Brief at 3, Engvall (No. C6-99-64); Respondent's Brief at 3,
Engvall (No. C6-99-64).
45. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 739. FELA allows an employee to recover damages
from an employer if the employee's injuries resulted from employer negligence.
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1997). LIA requires employers to provide safe equipment. 49
U.S.C. § 20701(1) (1997).
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manufacturer, seeking contribution or indemnity,4 and alleging
GM negligently designed and manufactured the locomotive's
handbrake.' GM moved for summaryjudgment on the grounds of
48
federal preemption. The district court granted GM's motion on
August 13, 1998."
9
Two months later, Soo Line and Engvall entered into a stipula-
tion 50 to dismiss Engvall's claims against Soo Line. 5' The trial court
subsequently entered final judgment.52
On January 8, 1999, Soo Line appealed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of GM23 The court of appeals
ruled Soo Line's appeal was untimely because dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction54 must be appealed within ninety days55
after entry of the judgment.56 This is true even when the district
court does not expressly determine that there is no just reason to
delay the appeal. 7
46. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 740. Indemnity and contribution are remedies
based on equitable principles that allow one tortfeasor to secure restitution from
another tortfeasor when he or she has paid more than his or her just share of li-
ability. White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 367, 137 N.W.2d 674, 677 (1965). In-
demnity allows the entire loss to be shifted to another tortfeasor. Id. Contribution
allows one tortfeasor to recover a proportionate share from the other tortfeasor.
Id.
47. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 739-40.
48. Id. at 740. Federal preemption is the principle adopted by the United
States Supreme Court that certain matters are of such a national character that
federal laws take precedence over state laws. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983). In Engvall, GM
asserted that federal law preempted Soo Line's state common law contribution
and indemnification claims, thereby precluding the court from exercising jurisdic-
tion over the claims. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 740.
49. Engval, 605 N.W.2d at 740.
50. MINN. R. Civ. P. 41.01 (a). This rule allows parties to voluntarily dismiss
an action by entering into a stipulation. See also Schoenfeld v. Buker, 262 Minn.
122, 131-32, 114 N.W.2d 560, 566-67 (1962). A stipulation acts as an agreement
between the two parties and has the same effect as a valid and binding contract. Id.
51. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 740.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In deciding the case, the court of appeals determined that judgment
for federal preemption constituted a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
55. MINN. R. APP. P. 104.01 (1998) (requiring a party to file an appeal within
90 days after entry of judgment). The rule has since been amended and now re-
quires an appeal to be taken from a judgment "within 60 days after service by any
party of written notice of its filing." MINN. R. APP. P. 104.01(1) (2000).
56. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 740.
57. Id. "Implicit in this ruling is the conclusion that an appeal from an inter-
locutoryjudgment is mandatory." Id. at 743. The appeals court relied on its deci-
sion in Semiconductor to reach this conclusion. Id. at 740.
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B. The Court's Analysis
The supreme court in Engvall reversed the court of appeals.58
The supreme court first concluded that Soo Line filed a timely ap-
peal because an interlocutory order dismissing a party based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable,
absent an express Rule 54.02 determination. 59 The court distin-
60
guished the present case from its earlier holding in McGowan.
The Engvall court noted that McGowan "addressed the policy con-
cerns of a party who is burdened by potentially unnecessary litiga-
tion when a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction is denied."6' The concerns present in McGowan do not
exist when, as in this case, a summary judgment motion is
granted.62 Thus, the court found McGowan inapplicable.
The Engvall court further reasoned that allowing an appeal
would undermine the policy against piecemeal litigation.64 The su-
preme court presumed the court of appeals' ruling would force fu-
ture appellants to guess when and from what to appeal, resulting in
65
numerous protective interlocutory appeals. Thus, the supreme
court concluded that GM's dismissal was not immediately appeal-
able, absent an express Rule 54.02 determination.66
The Engvall court further concluded that the court of appeals
erred in ruling that an appeal from an interlocutory judgment that
does not require an express certification by the trial court is man-
datory rather than permissive. 69 The court deemed the court of
appeals' ruling contrary to the collateral order doctrine" and the
policy against piecemeal litigation. 71 Thus, the court concluded
that failure to appeal from an interlocutory order does not result in
58. Id. at 739.
59. Id. at 744. See also supra Part II.B.
60. Id. For a discussion of McGowan, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 743-44.





67. Id. at 745.
68. Supra note 9.
69. Supra note 8.
70. Supra note 29.
71. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 745. Classifying immediately appealable interlocu-
tory judgments as permissive allows appellants to wait to appeal from the final
judgment, which could reduce the number of interlocutory appeals. Id.
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forfeiture of the right to appeal after a final judgment has been en-
tered.72
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ENGVALL DECISION
The court in Engvall was presented with an opportunity to clar-
ify which types of interlocutory judgments can be appealed without
an express Rule 54.02 determination and when such appeals can be
taken.73 The court used this opportunity to articulate a clear rule
that promotes judicial efficiency and economy.
A. The Minnesota Supreme Court Promulgated A Clear Standard
With this decision, the court gave litigators a clear standard to
follow when considering an appeal from an interlocutory judg-
ment. If the supreme court had affirmed the lower court's ruling,
litigators may have questioned whether the holding extends the
right to immediately appeal grants of summaryjudgment based on
personal jurisdiction and government immunity in multiparty suits.
The court, however, avoided uncertainty by clearly stating that it
will not allow interlocutory appeals without certification by the trial
judge when a motion for summary judgment is granted in a multi-
party suit.74
The court also avoided confusion by overruling the problem-
atic Semiconductor decision. In Semiconductor, the court of appeals
indicated, but did not explicitly state, that interlocutory appeals are
mandatory.75 The decision served to confuse and contradict Min-
76nesota's rules governing the time for taking an appeal. The su-
72. Id. With this ruling, the court not only reversed the lower court's deci-
sion, but it also overruled the lower court's decision in Semiconductor. Id.
73. Id. at 744.
74. Id.
75. Semiconductor, 543 N.W.2d at 123. The court never used the terms permis-
sive or mandatory. Id. Instead, it simply stated that the plaintiff had ninety days to
appeal an order dismissing one of the defendants, regardless of whether the trial
ended before that time. Id.
76. MINN. R. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (2000). The rule states in pertinent part:
Unless a different time is provided by statute, an appeal may be ta-
ken.. .from an appealable order within 60 days after service by any party
of written notice of its filing. An appeal may be taken from a judgment
entered pursuant to Rule 54.02, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,
within 60 days of the entry of the judgment only if the trial court makes
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and ex-
pressly directs the entry of a final judgment. The time to appeal from
any other judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54.02 shall not begin to
run until the entry of a judgment which adjudicates all the claims and
1246 [Vol. 27:2
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preme court clarified the possible contradiction by explicitly classi-
fying interlocutory appeals as permissive, thereby giving litigators a
clear indication of when to appeal an interlocutory order."
B. The Decision Promotes Judicial Efficiency And Economy
The supreme court's decision helps promote judicial efficiency
and economy in three ways. First, the opinion's clarity is likely to
reduce litigation because parties are now less likely to dispute
claims surrounding interlocutory appeals. If the supreme court
decided to uphold the ambiguous Semiconductor decision ,7 litigators
may have been forced to take interlocutory appeals in an attempt
to decipher the boundaries of the court's holding-a result many
courts seek to avoid.79
Second, the supreme court's decision limited the number of
interlocutory appeals parties may take, which prevents piecemeal
litigation. s° The policy against piecemeal litigation has long been
the means by which Minnesota and the majority of other jurisdic-
tions attempt to achieve a greater degree of judicial efficiency and
economy. Requiring a party to include all objections to the trial
rights and liabilities of the remaining parties.
Id. (emphasis added). When referring to the time to take an appeal, the statute
uses the term may rather than shall, indicating that appeals from interlocutory
judgments are permissive and not mandatory. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482,
485 (1947) (interpreting may to be permissive and shall to be mandatory when ap-
pearing in a statute); see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 979, 1375 (6th ed. 1990)
(stating may "usually is employed to imply permissive, optional or discretional, and
not mandatory action or conduct" while shall "is generally imperative or manda-
tory"); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935) (stating shall is ordinarily "the
language of command"). In other words, the statute does not require a party to
appeal interlocutory orders within sixty days of a judgment; it only grants a party
permission to appeal within sixty days. MINN. R. APP. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (2000). If
the drafters intended to force parties to appeal all appealable interlocutory judg-
ments within the sixty day time period, they would have substituted the word may
with shall or stated that a party will lose the right to appeal interlocutory orders if
not perfected within sixty days of the ruling.
77. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 745.
78. Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79. See generally ROBERTA. KATZMANN & MICHAEL TONRY, MANAGING APPEALS IN
FEDERAL COURTS 1 (Federal Judicial Center 1988) (noting the explosion of filings
in the courts of appeals since the 1970s and detailing the various ways courts have
attempted to deal with the problem); APPELLATE DELAY REDUCTION COMMITTEE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY REDUCTION 3 (American Bar Association
1988) (recognizing the high volume of cases and suggesting ways to reduce delay
in administering justice).
80. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 744.
81. Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc., 418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 1988) (stating the
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court's ruling allows an appellate court to consolidate its resources
into one appeal rather than several appeals, each requiring its own
set of briefs, oral arguments, opinions and copies of the record."
Furthermore, many adverse rulings will never require appellate re-
view because a losing party on a motion may ultimately prevail at
81trial and thus will not seek an appeal .
In response, one could argue that freely allowing interlocutory
appeals promotes judicial efficiency and provides for a fairer
trial.85 However, studies indicate that such a practice overcrowds
the appellate courts and diminishes their effectiveness. 86 Indeed,
purpose of preventing piecemeal litigation is to conserve judicial resources and
expedite trial proceedings); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, § 13.1, at 584
(stating the rationale behind requiring parties to wait until final judgment has
been rendered to appeal rests on a desire to achieve judicial economy); Harlon L.
Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 64 (1985)
(advocating for a reduction of appeals as a remedy for reducing the overcrowded
dockets of appellate courts); Judge Donald Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in
Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151, 1155-58 (1981) (arguing for a reduction
in appeals to promote judicial efficiency and proposing to give appellate courts
the discretion to hear only the most deserving appeals).
82. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, § 13.1, at 584. The preparation of
briefs, records, oral arguments, and opinions is extremely costly, and a reduction
in unnecessary interlocutory appeals would reduce these judicial expenses. Ber-
tram Willcox et al., Justice Lost - By What Appellate Papers Cost, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 934,
936 (1958) (noting the high costs of appeals); see also Sam E. Haddon, Note, Cost of
Appeal, 27 MONT. L. REv. 49, 49-50 (1965) (discussing the expenses associated with
appeals).
83. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, § 13.1, at 584. Other reasons for adher-
ing to the final judgment rule include: 1) The appellate court has a broader per-
spective when reviewing the various rulings being challenged; 2) The trial process
proceeds more swiftly; 3) The authority of the trial judge receives an increased
amount of respect; 4) Parties are prevented from delaying the trial or harassing an
opposing party by appealing every adverse ruling; 5) The rule achieves certainty
and predictability because lawyers know what may and may not be appealed. Id.
84. Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEx. L. REv. 126,
127 (1926). Sunderland argues that eliminating restrictions on interlocutory ap-
peals will decrease litigation over the question of whether parties may or may not
appeal particular cases. Id. Correcting the errors below as they occur may also aid
in reaching a verdict that is less likely to be reversed if appealed, thus avoiding a
wasted trial. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, § 13.1, at 584.
85. Jill Paradise Botler et al., Project, The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York: An Empirical Study of Its Powers and Functions as an Intermediate State
Court, 47 FORDHAM L. Rev. 929, 1003 (1979) (stating that many jurisdictions that
allow free interlocutory appeals, such as New York, believe broad powers of review
enable an appellate court to ensure that the litigants are accorded substantial jus-
tice).
86. Id. at 986. The Appellate Division of New York has one of the largest
caseloads in the United States, which poses a serious threat to the performance of
the court's functions. Id. A limit on interlocutory appeals would reduce the
caseload, making the court more efficient and reducing the cost to litigants. Id. at
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81with already burgeoning appellate caseloads, increases in inter-
locutory appeals will delay the dispute resolution and increase the
88costs of rendering decisions at both the appellate and trial level .
Finally, the court achieved a greater degree of judicial effi-
ciency and economy by ruling that interlocutory appeals that do
not require a Rule 54.02 determination are permissive rather than
mandatory.8 9 This ruling is followed by the majority of jurisdic-
tions.90 Classifying interlocutory appeals as permissive allows appel-
1006-07; see also ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 87
(1982) (stating interlocutory appeals take up a significant amount of an appellate
court's caseload and are often used as a delay tactic to disrupt the trial); David
Scheffel, Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in New York - Time Has Come For a More Effi-
cient Approach, 16 PACE L. REv. 607, 629 (1996) (examining the Report of the Ap-
pellate Division Task Force of 1989 and concluding that the New York Appellate
Division faces an overcrowded caseload, resulting in litigants having to wait an un-
reasonably long time for a ruling).
87. Supra note 79.
88. Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century ofJudicial Reform: Time
as the Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 253, 255 (1988) (stating delay in the
resolution of disputes is the most visible symptom of overcrowding); LARRY C.
FARMER, APPEALS EXPEDITING SYSTEMS: AN EVALUATION OF SECOND AND EIGHTH CIR-
CUIT PROCEDURES 1 (Federal Judicial Center 1981) (noting the disruption and de-
lays of appellate courts are results of an overcrowded docket); THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE PROCEDURE, INTRODUCTION TO EFFICIENCY
AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS I (American Bar Asso-
ciation 1977) (stating the consequences of the expanding workload of appellate
courts is increasing delays and rising costs).
89. Engvall v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 605 N.W.2d 738, 745 (Minn. 2000).
90. E.g., Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 756 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (stat-
ing interlocutory appeals are permissive); Robinson v. Computer Servicenters,
Inc., 360 So. 2d 299, 302 (Ala. 1978) (stating certain interlocutory appeals are
permissive); Orem v. Moore, 272 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Ark. 1954) (holding interlocutory
appeal may be taken before or after final judgment); Walton v. State, 968 P.2d
636, 641 (Colo. 1998) (stating failure to take interlocutory appeal does not pre-
clude ruling on issue after final judgment); Perky v. Perky, 156 So. 308, 309 (Fla.
1934) (stating appellate court may consider interlocutory orders that might have
been separately appealed from before final decree); Nat'l Found. Co. v. Post,
Buckley, Schuh &Jernigan, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 726, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
interlocutory appeal of an order granting partial summary judgment is permis-
sive); Hay v. McDaniel, 59 N.E. 1064, 1064 (Ind. 1901) (allowing plaintiff to inter-
locutory order to appoint a receiver before final judgment or after final judg-
ment); St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d
821, 833 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (holding party was not required to appeal an inter-
locutory decree before final judgment); Simeon v. Bd. of Levee Comm'r of Or-
leans Levee Dist., 124 So. 853, 856 (La. Ct. App. 1929) (ruling interlocutory appeal
could be taken before or after final judgment); Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v.
Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Mass. 1980) (holding interlocutory appeal is not
mandatory); Dep't ofTransp. v. Rowe, 521 S.E.2d 707, 710 (N.C. 1999) (classifying
interlocutory appeal as permissive); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 598 A.2d 568, 572
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding interlocutory appeals are permissive); Brooks v.
2000] 1249
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lants to wait to appeal from the final judgment if they so chose,
which could reduce the number of interlocutory appeals heard by
Minnesota's appellate courts.9' Semiconductor penalized litigants
who waited until after final judgment had been entered to take an
92appeal. The Semiconductor decision opposed Minnesota's policy
against piecemeal litigation. 93
Critics may argue that forcing litigants to immediately appeal
interlocutory orders makes the judicial system more efficient be-
cause appellants will be forced to anpeal a ruling that could elimi-
nate the need for a trial if reversed. However, this argument fails
when dealing with multiparty litigation because the trial will con-
tinue regardless of the presence of a third party. Furthermore, the
majority of lower court decisions are affirmed on appeal, which in-
dicates that forcing appellants to appeal an adverse interlocutory
ruling will not stop the majority of cases from continuing.95 Thus,
classifying appealable interlocutory orders as mandatory would not
make the appellate system more efficient.
V. CONCLUSION
The Engvall decision helped promote a greater degree of judi-
cial efficiency and economy in Minnesota. It limited the number of
instances when a party may take an interlocutory appeal and classi-
fied all interlocutory appeals as permissive. It also provided a clear
Roanoke County Sanitation Auth., 114 S.E.2d 758, 760 (Va. 1960) (ruling inter-
locutory appeals are permissive rather than mandatory); Eblin v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Affiliates, Inc., 455 S.E.2d 774, 781 (W. Va. 1995) (stating a party may
immediately appeal entry of partial summaryjudgment or wait to appeal until final
judgment has been rendered).
91. Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 745.
92. Semiconductor Automation, Inc. v. Lloyds of London, 543 N.W.2d 123,
124 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), rev. denied (Minn. 1996), overruled by Engvall v. Soo
Line R.R. Co., 605 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. 2000).
93. Emme, 418 N.W.2d at 179 (stating "the thrust of the rules governing the
appellate process is that appeals should not be brought or considered piece-
meal"). The decision also opposes the reasons for adopting MINN. R. Civ. P. 54.02.
Novus Equities Corp. v. EM-TY P'ship, 381 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. 1986) (stating
the primary goal of MINN. R. CIv. P. 54.02 is to reduce piecemeal litigation; see also
HERR & HAYDocK, supra note 30, § 54.9 (stating that the intent of Rule 54.02 is to
prevent piecemeal litigation).
94. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, § 13.1, at 584-85; Botler et al., supra note
85, at 1003.
95. Botler et al., supra note 85, at 990-91 (arguing to restrict interlocutory ap-
peals because so few intermediate orders are reversed, based on a 1975 statistic
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standard that helps guide litigators when considering interlocutory
appeals. Indeed, by overruling the Minnesota Court of Appeals'
erroneous decision in Semiconductor, the Minnesota Supreme Court
helped make civil procedure more certain and efficient.
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